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Abstract
Using a network approach we provide a characterization of a separating
equilibrium for standard signaling games where the sender’s payoff func-
tion is quasi-linear. Given a strategy of the sender, we construct a network
where the node set and the length between two nodes are the set of the
sender’s type and the difference of signaling costs, respectively. Construc-
tion of a separating equilibrium is then equivalent to constructing the
length between two nodes in the network under the condition that the
response of the receiver is a node potential.
We show that, when the set of the sender’s type is finite, the collection
of separating signaling functions forms a lower bounded lattice. We de-
scribe an algorithm to compute separating equilibrium strategies. When
the set of the sender’s type is a real interval, shortest path lengths are
antisymmetric and a node potential is unique up to a constant. A strat-
egy of the sender in a separating equilibrium is characterized by some
differential equation with a unique solution.
Our results can be readily applied to a broad range of economic sit-
uations, such as the standard job market signaling model of Spence (a
model not captured by earlier papers) and principal-agent models with
production.
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1 Introduction
A signaling game refers to a two-player game of incomplete information in which
one player has private information—a type—and the other is affected by the in-
formation. The informed player, the sender, can send a signal, contingent on
type, and the uninformed party, the receiver, takes an action, which may be con-
ditional on the observed signal. In equilibrium, the informed player optimally
chooses a signal, knowing that the uninformed player will take an optimal ac-
tion conditional on his inferences from the signal and the inferences will turn out
to be correct. If the inferences of the uninformed party leaves no uncertainty
about the informed player’s type, then the equilibrium is called separating. In
a separating equilibrium, the sender will deliver a type by type signal. Among
many equilibria, separating equilibria are of central interest because informa-
tional asymmetry is resolved.
Signaling games arise in many economic settings. For example, in the context
of industrial organization, firms may use their effort spent on advertising and
launching new products to signal the quality of their product. In auction the-
ory, an auctioneer with private information about the object’s quality may put
a reserve price as signal, taking a risk that an item in sale may not be sold in
the end (Cai et al. [1]). In finance, an issuer who has private information about
the assets may retain a fraction of the issue to signal his private information
(DeMarzo and Duffie [6]). Other examples can be found in surveys such as
Riley [20] and Sobel [22]. Our own analysis is motivated and illustrated by two
leading examples in the literature on economic theory. First, in the traditional
example due to Spence [23], a high-productivity job seeker invests in education
to distinguish himself from low-productivity ones when productivity is not di-
rectly observed by an employer. The second example is a principal-agent model
with production, where the production technology of the agent is not known to
the principal. The principal needs to offer a wage menu to incentivize the agent
to select the optimal production level.
CONTRIBUTION In this paper, we focus on those type separating strategies
of the sender that, combined with the induced optimal strategy of the receiver,
form a (separating) equilibrium. Such strategies are called SE strategies. We
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characterize SE strategies in a signaling game when the type space is a subset of
the real line. In case the type space is finite, we show that the collection of SE
strategies forms a lattice. We formulate an algorithm to compute SE strategies,
and apply our results in the principal-agent model. In case the type space
is a closed halfline, we identify conditions under which a unique SE strategy
exists, and describe how the unique SE strategy can be computed by solving a
differential equation.
Earlier results on the characterization of separating equilibrium in signaling
games, despite their seeming generality, fail to capture many simple and natural
extensions of the classic job market model by Spence. We achieve full coverage of
(generalizations of) Spence’ model by focusing on quasi-linear settings, that is,
settings in which the utility function of the sender is calculated as the payment
a by the receiver, subtracted the cost c(s, t) of signaling s when of type t (in
formula, US = a− c(s, t)). The advantage of quasi-linearity is that it separates
the cost of signaling from the response of the receiver, thereby making the cost
independent of the receivers response. This advantage translates itself into two
improvements upon previous literature, which are our main results.
First, we give a complete characterization of separating equilibrium that uses
only four fairly mild conditions, the most prominent one being that the cost
function should satisfy decreasing differences, the algebraic version of the single
crossing property. Under these conditions many of the results on separating
equilibrium can already be established. For example the—intuitive—result that
any separating equilibrium strategy is strictly increasing with type follows imme-
diately. Also—when type space is finite—the lattice structure of the collection
of separating equilibrium outcomes can already be established under these con-
ditions. Remarkably, we do not need any conditions on the partial derivatives
of the utility function of the sender. In fact we do not even need continuity, so
that these results apply in a wide variety of settings, for example when the type
space is finite.
Second, when type space is a closed halfline, we only need a further three rel-
atively natural and straightforward conditions on the primitives of the model
to guarantee existence and uniqueness of separating equilibrium. The require-
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ments on the signaling cost function are that it is continuous, and that it has
a continuously differentiable and bounded partial derivative with respect to the
signal. In contrast, Mailath [15] and Mailath and von Thadden [16] require the
utility function of the sender to be at least twice continuously differentiable, and
additionally need to impose several technical assumptions regarding signs and
moduli of both first and second order derivatives. In particular, the standard
job market model by Spence where the utility of the sender equals the payment
by the receiver minus the reciprocal of the type falls within our requirements,
while it is excluded by the conditions imposed by Mailath [15] and Mailath and
von Thadden [16].
APPROACH The technique we use to establish our results is in itself worth a
short discussion. We use the—essentially algebraic—theory of node potentials
on directed graphs to derive our results. This technique has recently been
applied with much success in the, related, context of mechanism design. See
for example Heydenreich et al. [9], Carbajal and Ely [2], Chung and Olszewski
[4] and Kos and Messner [14] for applications of the theory of networks to
mechanism design without differentiability. The algebraic nature of the theory
allows us to discard conditions on the first and second order partial derivatives
of the utility function of sender, the conditions that drive most of the earlier
results. Our proof technique highlights that differentiability is in itself not the
driving force of these results. Instead, these results are shown to rely only on the
implied algebraic structure of marginal gains in type pooling versus marginal
costs of signaling captured by the decreasing differences condition.
RELATED LITERATURE. Mailath [15] studies a model in which the utility func-
tion of the receiver is C2, utility is strictly monotonic in types and actions, and
strictly quasi-concave in signals, plus a technical condition on the first and sec-
ond order derivatives of the utility function for the sender, called boundedness.
Type space is assumed to be a compact interval, the signal space is assumed to
be equal to the type space 1 and the action space is the entire set of reals. Under
the assumption of single crossing it is shown that an one-to-one strategy is a
separating equilibrium strategy precisely when the strategy is strictly increasing
and it solves a characterizing differential equation. Existence and uniqueness of
1By the revelation principle this is without loss of generality.
Separating equilibrium in signaling games 4
a separating equilibrium strategy is then shown under the additional assumption
that the derivative of the utility function of the sender with respect to signals
satisfies a boundedness condition.
Mailath and von Thadden [16] study a model in which the utility function of the
sender and the best response function of the receiver under complete information
are both C2. Further, under complete information the receiver needs to have
a unique best response, and the induced valuation function of the sender needs
to satisfy a technical condition on both first and second order derivatives of
the valuation function. Thus, the conditions on the strategy of the receiver
are only implicitly formulated, in terms of the induced payoff function for the
sender. They show that if a separating equilibrium strategy of the receiver is
differentiable at a certain point, it is characterized by a differential equation at
that point. They also show that if (1) a strategy is separating, (2) it solves the
characterizing differential equation, and (3) it satisfies a version of the single-
crossing property, then that strategy is incentive-compatible. They apply their
results in several examples.
Quinzii and Rochet [19] study a model where both types and signals are higher
dimensional. They show for the case of linear, separable costs, that a separating
equilibrium exists under assumptions of smoothness of the productivity function,
plus convexity of the surplus function.
Hoppe et al. [10] study a matching market between a set of men and a set
of women. Each man and each woman has private information regarding their
type. The value of a match depends on both the type of the man and the woman
in question. 2 Signals are costly, but do not depend on type of either men or
women, and are linearly deducted from utility. In this model, Hoppe et al. [10]
show that there exists a single symmetric, strictly monotonic, and continuously
differentiable equilibrium. They also characterize this equilibrium by means of
a differential equation. However, the analysis does not rule out the existence of
non-symmetric, non-monotonic, or non-differentiable equilibria, and uniqueness
is not guaranteed.
2In fact it is defined as the product of both types. So, if a man is of type y and a woman
of type x, and they are matched, then this generates utility xy, both for him and her. Thus,
total utility generated by this match is 2xy, equally divided over both partners.
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ORGANIZATION. Section 2 presents the model of signaling games and several
notions of graph theory. In section 3 we discuss two applications, the job mar-
ket model and a principal-agent model with production. In section 4 we fully
characterize separating equilibrium in terms of node potentials for an induced
length function. In section 5 we discuss the implications of our characterization
in the case where type space is finite. We show that the set of SE strategies
forms a closed and lower bounded sublattice of n-dimensional Euclidean space.
We also describe an algorithm to compute SE strategies, and show how our
approach can be used to solve a principal-agent problem with production. In
section 6 we derive conditions to guarantee existence of a unique SE strategy
in case type space is a closed halfline. We show that the unique SE strategy
can be computed by solving an associated differential equation. We illustrate
the power of our techniques in four applications, among those the job market
model and an example of a model without differentiability. All omitted proofs
are in the appendix.
2 The model
We consider the following standard signaling game. There are two risk neutral
players, a sender and a receiver. The type space and signal space of the sender
are denoted by T and S, respectively. We assume that the type space T is a
subset of R+ and that the signal space S equals R+. Further, T is assumed to
have a smallest element t. The action space of the receiver is A = R+.
The game proceeds as follows. Nature decides the sender’s type t ∈ T , and the
result is communicated to the sender only. With knowledge of his type t, the
sender chooses a signal s ∈ S, incurring a cost c(s, t) depending on both type
and signal. Upon observing the sender’s signal s, the receiver chooses an action
a ∈ A. The sender receives a payoff US(a, s, t) = a − c(s, t) and the receiver
receives a payoff UR(a, t). Then the game ends.
Note that the payoff of the receiver does not depend on the signal s. This is
called the “pure signaling case” in Quinzii and Rochet [19].
ASSUMPTIONS We adopt the following four structural assumptions.
[1] The cost function c(s, t) is strictly increasing in s and for each s > 0
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strictly decreasing in t. Further, for all t, c(0, t) = 0.
[2] The cost function c(s, t) satisfies decreasing differences. That is, for all
s, s′ ∈ S and t, t′ ∈ T with s > s′ and t > t′ it holds that
c(s, t′)− c(s′, t′) > c(s, t)− c(s′, t).
[3] For every t ∈ T there exists an α(t) ∈ A with
UR(α(t), t) > UR(a, t) for all a ∈ A \ {α(t)}.
In other words, for every t ∈ T , α(t) := argmax
a∈A
UR(a, t) is unique.
[4] The resulting function α is strictly increasing in t, and α(t) = 0.
A (pure) strategy of the sender is a mapping σ : T → S. A (pure) strategy of
the receiver is a function γ : S → A. Since in this paper we only focus on pure
strategies, we omit the prefix “pure” from now on.
Definition A strategy pair (σ, γ) is a separating equilibrium (SE) if the strat-
egy σ is one-to-one and, moreover, for all t ∈ T we have
[1] US
(
γ(σ(t)), σ(t), t
) ≥ US(γ(s), s, t) for all s ∈ S
[2] UR
(
γ(σ(t)), t
) ≥ UR(a, t) for all a ∈ A.
Condition [1] states that the strategy σ is a best response for the sender given
the strategy γ of the receiver. Condition [2] states that the strategy γ is a best
response for the receiver given the strategy σ of the sender.
If a strategy σ of the sender is part of a separating equilibrium it is called
a separating equilibrium strategy (SE strategy). The aim of this paper is to
characterize the set of SE strategies 3.
We end this section with a useful observation.
Proposition 2.1 Let (σ, γ) be an SE. Then (γ ◦ σ)(t) = α(t) for all t ∈ T .
Further, σ(t) = 0.
3Note that the analogous task for the strategies of the receiver is a triviality.
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Proof. Let (σ, γ) be an SE. By assumption [3] and part [2] of the definition
of SE, (γ ◦ σ)(t) = α(t) for all t ∈ T .
Write s = σ(t). We show that s = 0. Suppose s > 0. Since (γ ◦ σ)(t) = α(t) for
all t, in particular (γ ◦ σ)(t) = α(t) = 0 by assumption [4]. So,
US
(
γ(σ(t)), σ(t), t
)
= γ(σ(t))− c(σ(t), t) = 0− c(s, t).
Since S = R+, and s > 0 by assumption, we can take 0 ≤ s < s. Then, since
γ(s) ∈ A = R+ and c(s, t) is strictly increasing in s,
US
(
γ(s), s, t
)
= γ(s)− c(s, t) > 0− c(s, t) = US
(
γ(σ(t)), σ(t), t
)
.
This contradicts the assumption that (σ, γ) is an SE. Hence, σ(t) = s = 0.
3 Motivating examples
Many examples in the literature fall within the model specification we described
in Section 2. In this section we discuss two examples in particular. The first
is a natural version of the classic job market signaling model by Spence. The
second is a principal-agent model with production.
3.1 Job market signaling
Spence [23] is the seminal paper in signaling games. In his model, a job appli-
cant has private information about his productivity, denoted as t. Because the
applicant’s productivity is not observed by the employer, the applicant may try
to signal his productivity to an employer indirectly by investing in education,
denoted as s. Since it is less costly for high types to take the same level of
education than for low types, there can be an equilibrium in which different
types choose different signals.
We consider a job market model in which the ability of the worker is charac-
terized by an attribute t ∈ T = [t,∞) 4 with t ≥ 0. After having observed
his ability, the worker has to choose a level of education s ∈ S = [0,∞). The
employer then observes the level s of education chosen by the worker, and based
on that information chooses a wage a ∈ A = [0,∞).
4In the original Spence model, T = {1, 2}.
Separating equilibrium in signaling games 8
We assume that the employer has a unique optimal wage schedule α : T →
A that is increasing in the observed level of education, and α(t) = 0. The
assumption of increasing wages is a very natural assumption in the context
where a higher level of t signifies higher ability. We also assume that the cost
of signaling for the worker is a separable function
c(s, t) = h(s) · g(t),
where h and g are continuous functions from S and T respectively to R++,
h(0) = 0, h is strictly increasing, and g is strictly decreasing.
Hence, the utility to a worker is given by
US(a, s, t) = a− h(s) · g(t).
This model, a straightforward and natural version of the classic model by
Spence, satisfies all conditions we specified in the previous section. In par-
ticular, this model automatically satisfies decreasing differences, the algebraic
version of the single crossing property. Indeed, take s, s′ ∈ S and t, t′ ∈ T with
s > s′ and t > t′. Then h(s) > h(s′) and g(t′) > g(t). So,
c(s, t′)− c(s′, t′) = h(s) · g(t′)− h(s′) · g(t′)
= (h(s)− h(s′)) · g(t′)
> (h(s)− h(s′)) · g(t)
= c(s, t)− c(s′, t).
Yet, this model is not covered by earlier papers such as Mailath [15] and Mailath
and von Thadden [16]. For example, when h(s) = s, then ∂
2US
∂s2
= 0, which places
this model outside the scope of those papers.
3.2 Principal-agent model with production
Another natural and widely applied class of signaling games is those where the
type space T is finite, T = {t1, . . . , tn}. One application is, again, the original
job market model of Spence. A second application is the principal-agent model
with production. For an elaborate discussion of this application see for example
Laffont and Martimort [13].
A firm, the principal, wants to delegate to an agent the production of q units
of a good. The value for the principal of these q units is S(q) where S′ > 0,
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S′′ < 0 and S(0) = 0. The production cost of the agent is unobservable to
the principal, but it is common knowledge that the fixed cost is F , and that
the marginal cost θ belongs to the set Θ = {θ1, . . . θn}, with θ1 ≥ . . . ≥ θn.
The ex ante probability that the agent has marginal cost θi is ηi. Thus, with
probability θi the agent has cost function C(q, θi) = F + θi · q.
When taking his production decision the agent is informed about his marginal
cost θ. Marginal cost θ is the agent’s private information. The choice problem
for the principal is to select a menu of contracts
{(pi, qi) | i = 1, . . . , n}
that separates types of the agent. So the agent with marginal cost θi needs to
be given the incentive to select (pi, qi).
In this context, the type space is T = { 1
θi
| i = 1, . . . , n}. By assumption in our
general model, A = S = R+. Further, given the selected menu {(pi, qi) | i =
1, . . . , n} of contracts, the response function α : T → A defined by α( 1
θi
) = pi of
the receiver (the principal) then mimics the above menu of contracts. The cost
function of the sender being of type t and sending signal q is c(q, t) = F + q
t
. So,
the utility function of the sender being of type t, sending signal q, and receiving
payment p is
US(t, q, p) = p− F − q
t
,
which is indeed of the form we discussed earlier in the previous example. There-
fore, this application too falls within our specification. In particular, the utility
function of the sender satisfies decreasing differences.
4 Graph representation of SE strategies
We provide a graph theoretic interpretation of SE strategies. We recall some
basic terms from graph theory. A directed graph or digraph is a pair G = (V,E)
where V is an arbitrary set and E is a collection of ordered pairs (u, v) of
elements u, v ∈ V with u 6= v. The elements of V are called nodes or vertices,
and the elements of E are called arcs. The complete digraph is the digraph
G = (V,E) where E is the set of all possible ordered pairs of distinct elements
of V .
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4.1 The characterization
Let G = (V,E) be a complete digraph. An arc length on G is a function
l : E → R. A function p : V → R is called a node potential for arc length l on
G = (V,E) if for all arcs (u, v) ∈ E
p(v)− p(u) ≤ l(u, v).
Let σ be a strategy of the sender. Let H = (T,Q) be the complete digraph on
the type space T , so Q = {(u, v) ∈ T × T | u 6= v}. Define the arc length l(σ)
on H by, for all t, t′ ∈ T ,
l(σ)(t, t′) = c(σ(t′), t)− c(σ(t), t)
Theorem 4.1 A strategy σ of the sender is an SE strategy if and only if σ is
one-to-one, σ(t) = 0, and α is a node potential for l(σ) on H.
Proof. We show both implications separately.
A. Let (σ, γ) be an SE. Since σ is separating, it is one-to-one. Further, by
Proposition 2.1, σ(t) = 0. Also by Proposition 2.1, (γ ◦ σ)(t) = α(t) for all t.
Using [1] of the definition of separating equilibrium, for all t and s
α(t)− c(σ(t), t) = (γ ◦ σ)(t)− c(σ(t), t) ≥ γ(s)− c(s, t).
Substitution of s = σ(t′) and rewriting then yields
α(t′)− α(t) ≤ c(σ(t′), t)− c(σ(t), t) = l(σ)(t, t′)
for all t, t′ ∈ T . Hence, α is a node potential for l(σ) on H.
B. Conversely, let σ be a one-to-one strategy of the sender with σ(t) = 0 and
α(t′)− α(t) ≤ c(σ(t′), t)− c(σ(t), t).
for all t, t′ ∈ T . Since σ is one-to-one, for every s ∈ S there is at most one t ∈ T
with σ(t) = s. So, we can define the strategy γ of the receiver by
γ(s) =
{
α(t) if t ∈ T is such that σ(t) = s
0 otherwise.
It suffices to show that (σ, γ) is a Nash equilibrium. First, for all a ∈ A
UR(γ(σ(t)), t) = UR(α(t), t) ≥ UR(a, t)
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by definition of γ and α. So, γ is a best response of the receiver to σ.
Second, suppose the sender is of type t. Take s ∈ S. Suppose there exists t′ ∈ T
with σ(t′) = s. Then γ(s) = α(t′). So, by assumption
US
(
γ(σ(t)), σ(t), t
)
= α(t)− c(σ(t), t) ≥ α(t′)− c(σ(t′), t) = US
(
γ(s), s, t
)
.
Otherwise γ(s) = 0. Then, since α(t) = 0, σ(t) = 0, and c(s, t) is increasing in
s, from the definition of γ and the above assumption we get
US
(
γ(σ(t)), σ(t), t
)
= α(t)− c(σ(t), t)
≥ α(t)− c(σ(t), t)
= 0− c(0, t)
≥ 0− c(s, t)
= US
(
γ(s), s, t
)
.
Hence, σ is a best response for the sender to γ.
4.2 A few useful consequences
We need a few direct consequences of the basic characterization in the remainder
of this paper. We discuss these here in this section. One direct consequence of
the above characterization is the following observation.
Proposition 4.2 Let σ be an SE strategy. Then σ is strictly increasing in t.
Proof. Take t, t′ ∈ T with t′ > t. To show: σ(t′) > σ(t). Since σ is an SE
strategy, by Theorem 4.1
α(t′)− α(t) ≤ c(σ(t′), t)− c(σ(t), t).
By assumption [4] this implies c(σ(t′), t) > c(σ(t), t). Hence, since c(s, t) is
strictly increasing in s by assumption [1], it follows that σ(t′) > σ(t).
An arc length l on H is strictly monotone if l(t, t′)+l(t′, t) > 0 for all t 6= t′. The
arc length l is decomposition monotone if for any t, t′, t′′ ∈ T with t < t′ < t′′
we have l(t, t′′) > l(t, t′) + l(t′, t′′) and l(t′′, t) > l(t′′, t′) + l(t′, t).
Lemma 4.3 Suppose σ is strictly increasing and c has decreasing differences.
Then arc length l(σ) is strictly monotone and decomposition monotone on H.
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Proof. We first show that l(σ) is strictly monotone. Take t, t′ with t < t′.
Then σ(t′) > σ(t) by assumption. So, since c has decreasing differences,
l(σ)(t, t′) + l(σ)(t′, t) = c(σ(t′), t)− c(σ(t), t) + c(σ(t), t′)− c(σ(t′), t′) > 0.
In order to prove that l(σ) is decomposition monotone, take t, t′, t′′ ∈ T with
t < t′ < t′′. Then, because σ(t′′) > σ(t′) and c has decreasing differences,
l(σ)(t, t′′) = c(σ(t′′), t)− c(σ(t), t)
= c(σ(t′′), t)− c(σ(t′), t) + c(σ(t′), t)− c(σ(t), t)
> c(σ(t′′), t′)− c(σ(t′), t′) + c(σ(t′), t)− c(σ(t), t)
= l(σ)(t′, t′′) + l(σ)(t, t′).
Similarly, we can derive that l(σ)(t′′, t) > l(σ)(t′, t) + l(σ)(t′′, t′). Hence, l(σ) is
decomposition monotone.
5 Characterization of SE when T is finite
Finding a separating equilibrium strategy σ is equivalent to constructing an
arc length l(σ) so that α is a node potential for l(σ) on H. We use this to
characterize SE strategies.
5.1 The characterization
In this section we assume that T = {t1, . . . , tn} with ti < ti+1 for all i =
1, . . . , n− 1. We first use Theorem 4.1 to provide a further characterization for
this specific setting. Next, we use the resulting characterization to construct a
separating equilibrium. Define
R = {(tk, tk+1) | k = 1, . . . , n− 1} ∪ {(tk+1, tk) | k = 1, . . . , n− 1}.
Theorem 5.1 A strategy σ of the sender is an SE strategy if and only if σ is
one-to-one, σ(t) = 0, and α is a node potential for l(σ) on the restricted graph
(T,R).
Proof. The “only if” part is straightforward. To show the “if” part, assume
that α(t′)− α(t) ≤ l(σ)(t, t′) for all (t, t′) in R. Take (tk, tk+i) ∈ Q with i ≥ 2.
Since (tk+j , tk+j+1) ∈ R for all j = 0, . . . , i− 1,
α(tk+j+1)− α(tk+j) ≤ l(σ)(tk+j , tk+j+1).
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Therefore,
α(tk+i)− α(tk) =
i−1∑
j=0
(α(tk+j+1)− α(tk+j))
≤
i−1∑
j=0
l(σ)(tk+j , tk+j+1)
≤ l(σ)(tk, tk+i).
The last inequality follows from decomposition monotonicity of l(σ), which in
its turn follows from Proposition 4.2, assumption [2], and Lemma 4.3.
5.2 Structure of the set of SE strategies
In this section we show that the set of SE strategies form a lattice. We use this
fact to describe an elementary algorithm to check for existence of SE strategies.
Let L denote the set of all non-decreasing sequences (s1, . . . , sn) in S
n with
s1 = 0, and for all k = 1, . . . , n− 1,
c(sk+1, tk+1)− c(sk, tk+1) ≤ α(tk+1)− α(tk) ≤ c(sk+1, tk)− c(sk, tk).
Proposition 5.2 Let σ be an SE strategy. Then (σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) ∈ L. Con-
versely, let s ∈ L. Then σ : ti 7→ si defines an SE strategy.
Proof. Suppose that s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ L. Define σ : T → S by σ(tk) = sk for
all k. Clearly, σ(t) = 0. We show that σ is strictly increasing (and hence one-to-
one). Since α is strictly increasing by assumption [4], we have α(tk+1)−α(tk) >
0. Therefore, since s ∈ L,
c(sk+1, tk+1)− c(sk, tk+1) < c(sk+1, tk)− c(sk, tk)
This implies sk 6= sk+1. Then, since s ∈ L, also sk+1 > sk. Further,
α(tk+1)− α(tk) ≤ c(sk+1, tk)− c(sk, tk)
= c(σ(tk+1), tk)− c(σ(tk), tk)
= l(σ)(tk, tk+1).
In the same way
α(tk)− α(tk+1) ≤ l(σ)(tk+1, tk).
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Hence, by Theorem 5.1, σ is an SE strategy. The converse follows directly from
Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.1.
Thus, in the case where T is finite, characterization of the collection of SE strate-
gies reduces to characterization of the set L. This is our aim in the remainder
of this section.
Since L is a subset of Rn it is partially ordered by the usual coordinate-wise
order. For x, y ∈ Rn, let x ∨ y ∈ Rn be defined by (x ∨ y)i = max{xi, yi} and
let x ∧ y ∈ Rn be defined by (x ∧ y)i = min{xi, yi}. A subset X of Rn is called
a sublattice of Rn when for all x, y ∈ X also x ∨ y ∈ X and x ∧ y ∈ X.
Theorem 5.3 The set L is a closed and lower bounded sublattice of Rn.
Proof. Take two elements s = (s1, . . . , sn) and r = (r1, . . . , rn) in L. Define
x = s ∧ r. Clearly x is non-decreasing, and x1 = 0. Take k. We show that
c(xk+1, tk+1)− c(xk, tk+1) ≤ α(tk+1)− α(tk) ≤ c(xk+1, tk)− c(xk, tk).
If either xk = sk and xk+1 = sk+1, or if xk = rk and xk+1 = rk+1, this follows
from the assumption that s, r ∈ L. Suppose that xk = sk and xk+1 = rk+1.
Then we have
c(xk+1, tk+1)− c(xk, tk+1) ≤ c(sk+1, tk+1)− c(sk, tk+1)
≤ α(tk+1)− α(tk),
where the first inequality holds because xk+1 ≤ sk+1, xk = sk, and c is strictly
increasing s. Similarly,
c(xk+1, tk)− c(xk, tk) ≥ α(tk+1)− α(tk).
In the same way it can be shown that s ∨ r ∈ L. Hence, L is a lattice. Finally,
L is clearly closed, and, since L is subset of Rn+, also lower bounded.
5.3 An algorithm
We present a simple iterative procedure to compute an SE strategy in this
setting. When L is not empty, the procedure produces an SE strategy. When L
is empty, the procedure will detect this and decide it is not possible to compute
an SE strategy.
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We start by choosing s1 = 0. Now suppose that sk is chosen. Choose sk+1 ∈ S
so that
α(tk+1)− α(tk) ≤ c(sk+1, tk)− c(sk, tk)
and
α(tk+1)− α(tk) ≥ c(sk+1, tk+1)− c(sk, tk+1).
It is not always possible to choose such an sk+1. However, as soon as such
a choice is possible, automatically sk+1 > sk by the assumption of decreasing
differences for the cost function c(s, t). Thus, the procedure generates a sequence
s = (s1, . . . sn), and by construction s ∈ L, unless at some point the above
inequalities do not admit a feasible choice for sk+1.
Example. Consider a signaling game with T = {1, 2, 3} and cost function
c(s, t) = 1
t
(1− 1
s+1 ). First consider the case where (α(1), α(2), α(3)) = (1, 2, 3).
In this case there is no SE because the marginal cost for the sender is uniformly
smaller than one, while the marginal benefit by mimicking a higher type is
one, so that every type except the top will pretend to be a higher type. Our
algorithm states
[1] s1 = 0
[2] Choose s2 > 0 such that
1
2 (1− 1s2+1 ) ≤ 1 ≤ (1− 1s2+1 ).
[3] Choose s3 > 0 such that
1
3 (
1
s2+1
− 1
s3+1
) ≤ 1 ≤ 12 ( 1s2+1 − 1s3+1 ).
The condition in step 2 can be rewritten to −1 ≤ 1
s2+1
≤ 0, which is not feasible.
Hence, the algorithm gets stuck in step 2.
Now consider the case where (α(1), α(2), α(3)) = (0, 1/3, 1/2). The algorithm
states
[1] s1 = 0
[2] Choose s2 > 0 such that
1
2 (1− 1s2+1 ) ≤ 13 ≤ (1− 1s2+1 ).
[3] Choose s3 > 0 such that
1
3 (
1
s2+1
− 1
s3+1
) ≤ 16 ≤ 12 ( 1s2+1 − 1s3+1 ), or
1
s2+1
− 12 ≤ 1s3+1 ≤ 1s2+1 − 13 .
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The condition in step 2 states that 13 ≤ 1s2+1 ≤ 23 . If we choose 1s2+1 = 13 , s3
must be chosen such that 1/(s3 + 1) ∈ [−1/6, 0] in step 3. Again, there does
not exist such s3 > 0 and the algorithm gets stuck.
We have an SE, though. For instance, the choice of 1
s2+1
= 23 in step 2 gives
the feasible condition 1/(s3 + 1) ∈ [1/6, 1/3] in step 3.
Thus, in general our algorithm may get stuck, even though an SE strategy exists,
and equivalently L is not empty. We can avoid this irregularity by making an
appropriate choice in each step of the algorithm. Since L is a closed and lower
bounded lattice, it has a minimum element as soon as L is not empty. This
minimum element of L is the least costly SE strategy, and it is known as the
Riley outcome. Our algorithm produces the Riley outcome when we consistently
choose the lowest signal that satisfies the conditions, that is, the Riley outcome
is obtained by choosing sk+1 such that
α(tk+1)− α(tk) = c(sk+1, tk)− c(sk, tk).
Finally we give a condition that guarantees existence of an SE strategy.
Assumption [E] For all t, the cost function c(s, t) is continuous in s, and
c(s, t)→∞ as s→∞.
Since α is strictly increasing, c(s, t) is strictly increasing for all t, and c(s, t) sat-
isfies decreasing differences, by assumption [E] such a choice of sk+1 is feasible.
5.4 The principal-agent model with production
We review the principal-agent model from section 3.2 and check whether the
principal can select a menu
{(pi, qi) | i = 1, . . . , n}
that separates types of the agent. Thus, we need to check non-emptiness of L,
the set of all non-decreasing sequences (s1, . . . , sn) in S
n with s1 = 0, and for
all k = 1, . . . , n− 1,
c(sk+1, tk+1)− c(sk, tk+1) ≤ α(tk+1)− α(tk) ≤ c(sk+1, tk)− c(sk, tk).
This boils down to feasibility of the system
θk+1 ≤ pk+1 − pk
qk+1 − qk ≤ θk
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or alternatively
pk+1 − pk
θk
≤ qk+1 − qk ≤ pk+1 − pk
θk+1
.
From these inequalities it is clear that the principal can always choose a contract
menu that separates the types of the agent, by starting with p0 = q0 = 0, and
iteratively, after having chosen (pk, qk), choosing the next item (pk+1, qk+1) on
the menu in such a way that it satisfies the above two inequalities.
6 Characterization of SE when T is a continuum
If the type space T is a continuum, we can characterize a separating equilibrium
strategy as a solution of an integral equation. The environment is the same as
before except that the sender’s type space is the interval T = [t,∞). Recall that
both the set of signals S and the action space A are R+.
ASSUMPTIONS We adopt the following three additional structural assump-
tions.
[5] The function α is continuous and α(t)→∞ as t→∞ 5.
[6] The cost function c(s, t) is continuous on S × T .
[7] For all t, the partial derivative cs(s, t) of c(s, t) with respect to s exists,
and cs(s, t) is continuous and bounded on S × T .
Proposition 6.1 The function cs(s, t) is non-increasing in t.
Proof. By assumption [2], for h > 0 and t ≤ t′,
c(s+ h, t′)− c(s, t′) ≤ c(s+ h, t)− c(s, t).
By assumption [7] we can divide both sides by h and take limits for h → 0,
which yields the inequality cs(s, t
′) ≤ cs(s, t).
We need the following observation in this setting.
Lemma 6.2 Suppose that σ is an SE strategy. Then, σ is strictly increasing
and continuous.
5In fact all we need is that for all a ∈ A there exists a t ∈ T with α(t) = a. Assumption
[5] is simply a convenient way, but by no means the only way, to establish this.
Separating equilibrium in signaling games 18
Proof. Let (σ, γ) be an SE. Then σ is strictly increasing by Proposition 4.2.
We show that σ is continuous. Take t ∈ T . Define σ(t+) := lim
ε↓0
σ(t+ ε). Since
(σ, γ) is an SE, for every sufficiently small ε > 0 we have
γ(σ(t+ ε))− c(σ(t+ ε), t+ ε) ≥ γ(σ(t))− c(σ(t), t+ ε).
Since γ(σ(t+ε)) = α(t+ε) and γ(σ(t)) = α(t) by Proposition 2.1, this inequality
implies that
c(σ(t+ ε), t+ ε)− c(σ(t), t+ ε) ≤ α(t+ ε)− α(t).
Since c(s, t) is continuous by assumption [6] and α is continuous by assumption
[5], taking limits as ε ↓ 0 yields
c(σ(t+), t)− c(σ(t), t) ≤ 0.
So, σ(t+) ≤ σ(t) by assumption [1], which implies that σ is right-continuous.
Similarly, σ is left-continuous. Hence, σ is continuous.
6.1 The characterization
We characterize SE strategies for the sender.
In the characterization we need the following notions. Consider a complete
digraph G = (V,E) on a finite set V of nodes. A path is a vector pi = (v0, . . . , vk)
with (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i = 0, . . . , k− 1. For two nodes u, v ∈ V , a path from
u to v is a path (v0, . . . , vk) with v0 = u and vk = v. For r, t ∈ T , the set of all
paths from r to t is denoted by Π(r, t).
Let l be an arc length on G. The length of a path pi = (v0, . . . , vk), denoted by
length(l)(pi), is defined as
length(l)(pi) =
k−1∑
i=0
l(vi, vi+1).
The distance from r to t with respect to the the arc length l(σ) is defined by
dist(σ)(r, t) = inf
pi∈Π(r,t)
length(l(σ))(pi).
Take a ∈ A. By assumptions [4] and [5] there exists a t ∈ T with α(t) = a. In
other words, α−1 : A→ T exists. Take (s, a) ∈ S ×A. Define
H(s, a) := cs(s, α
−1(a)).
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We have the following result.
Theorem 6.3 A strategy σ is an SE strategy if and only if σ = γ−1 ◦ α, where
γ : S → A is a solution to the initial value problem
γ′(s) = H(s, γ(s)) with γ(0) = 0,
and γ(s)→∞ as s→∞.
Proof. The proof is in two parts.
A. Let σ be an SE strategy. By Lemma B.5 it follows that
α(t) =
∫ t
t
h(σ)(x)dσ(x),
where h(σ)(x) = cs(σ(x), x). Further, σ is continuous and strictly increasing
by Lemma 6.2. So, since σ(t) = 0, either σ(T ) = [0,∞), or there is an s∗
with σ(T ) = [0, s∗). Suppose the latter. We derive a contradiction. Define
γ(s) = (α ◦ σ−1)(s) for all s ∈ [0, s∗). Then γ(0) = 0 by Proposition 2.1 and
assumption [4].
Take s ∈ [0, s∗). By Theorem A.1 the change of variable y = σ(x) yields for
s = σ(t) that
γ(s) = (α ◦ σ−1)(s) =
∫ σ(t)
σ(t)
cs(y, σ
−1(y))dy =
∫ s
0
H(y, γ(y))dy.
Since the function y 7→ H(y, γ(y)) is continuous by Lemma 6.2 and assumptions
[5] and [7], the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus states that γ is differentiable,
and that for all s ∈ [0, s∗)
γ′(s) = H(s, γ(s))−H(0, γ(0)).
Since H(0, γ(0)) = H(0, 0) = cs(0, α
−1(0)) = cs(0, t) = 0, we see that γ is a
partial solution to the differential equation. By Theorem C.2 there is a unique
solution f , and f(s) = γ(s) = (α ◦ σ−1)(s) for all s ∈ [0, s∗). This however
implies that for every t ∈ T
α(t) = (α ◦ σ−1)(σ(t)) = γ(σ(t)) = f(σ(t)) ≤ f(s∗).
This contradicts assumption [5]. Hence, σ(T ) = [0,∞), and γ coincides with
the solution f of the initial value problem.
Separating equilibrium in signaling games 20
B. Conversely, let γ : S → A be a solution to the initial value problem
γ′(s) = H(s, γ(s)) with γ(0) = 0.
Then γ is differentiable and hence continuous. Further, since γ′(s) = cs(s, γ(s)) >
0 by assumption [1], γ is also strictly increasing.
Further, since γ(s)→∞ as s→∞, for every t there exists an s with γ(s) = α(t).
So we can define σ = f−1 ◦α. Then also σ is strictly increasing and continuous
by assumptions [4] and [5]. Moreover, σ(t) = f−1(α(t)) = f−1(0) = 0. So,
by Theorem 4.1 it suffices to show that α is a node potential for l(σ). Take
t, t′ ∈ T . We show that
α(t′)− α(t) ≤ l(σ)(t, t′).
On the one hand, by definition of σ,
α(t′)− α(t) = (f ◦ σ)(t′)− (f ◦ σ)(t) =
∫ σ(t′)
σ(t)
f ′(x)dx
=
∫ σ(t′)
σ(t)
H(x, f(x))dx =
∫ σ(t′)
σ(t)
cs(x, α
−1(f(x))dx
=
∫ σ(t′)
σ(t)
cs(x, σ
−1(x))dx.
On the other hand,
l(σ)(t, t′) = c(σ(t′), t)− c(σ(t), t) =
∫ σ(t′)
σ(t)
cs(x, t)dx.
Now note that, since σ is strictly increasing, for any x ≥ σ(t) we have σ−1(x) ≥
t. Therefore cs(x, σ
−1(x)) ≤ cs(x, t) for any x ≥ σ(t) by Proposition 6.1. Hence,
α(t′)− α(t) =
∫ σ(t′)
σ(t)
cs(x, σ
−1(x))dx ≤
∫ σ(t′)
σ(t)
cs(x, t)dx = l(σ)(t, t
′).
This completes the proof.
6.2 Uniqueness of the SE strategy
We show there is a unique SE strategy in the model where T is a continuum,
under the condition that the solution γ∗ of the differential equation has γ∗(s)→
∞ when s→∞.
Separating equilibrium in signaling games 21
Theorem 6.4 The unique SE strategy is σ = (γ∗)−1◦α, where γ∗ is the unique
solution to the initial value problem
γ′(s) = H(s, γ(s)) with γ(0) = 0.
Proof. The function H is continuous, and non-increasing in the second argu-
ment due to assumptions [2], [4], and [7]. So, the initial value problem
f ′(s) = G(s, f(s)) with f(0) = 0
has a unique solution f∗ by Theorem C.2. The above result now follows imme-
diately from Theorem 6.3.
7 Applications
In this section we present a few applications and direct consequences of our re-
sults. We first discuss a simple example to illustrate the computational power of
our results. The second application is the continuous-type version of the classic
job market model by Spence [23] we presented in section 3.1. Thirdly, we illus-
trate the scope of our results in an example outside the context of differentiable
utility. Finally we briefly discuss how our results contribute to the theory on
mechanism design and implementation.
7.1 Application: the differentiable case
As a first application we consider the case where α is differentiable.
Corollary 7.1 Suppose α is differentiable on T . Then, the unique SE strat-
egy σ∗ is also differentiable and its inverse τ = (σ∗)−1 solves the initial value
problem
α′(τ(s)) · τ ′(s) = cs(s, τ(s)) with τ(0) = t.
Proof. From Theorem 6.4 it follows immediately that the SE strategy σ
is differentiable as well. Further, by differentiating both sides in the integral
expression for α with respect to s, we have the differential equation directly
yielding σ.
Example. Take α(t) = t2 and c(s, t) = s
t+1 . It is straightforward to check
that this model satisfies all conditions [1] till [7]. Thus, the above corollary
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applies, and
2 · τ(s) · τ ′(s) = 1
τ(s) + 1
.
This can be rewritten to the differential equation
2 · τ(s) · (τ(s) + 1) · τ ′(s) = 1
which yields 23τ(s)
3 + τ(s)2 = s. It immediately follows that σ(t) = 23 t
3 + t2.
In fact, the same analysis applies to the situation where α is strictly increasing
and continuously differentiable, and c(s, t) = s · g(t), where g is any strictly
positive, continuous, and strictly decreasing function on R+. Then by the above
corollary
α′(τ(s))
g(τ(s))
· τ ′(s) = 1.
Integrating both sides with respect to s and using the substitution z = τ(s) and
dz = τ ′(s)ds for the left-hand side yields
σ(t) = (s =)
∫ t
0
α′(z)
g(z)
dz.
This integral immediately renders the unique (continuously differentiable) sep-
arating equilibrium strategy.
7.2 Application: job market signaling
Consider the following instance of the job market signaling game discussed in
section 3.1. The applicant is the sender and the employer is the receiver, re-
spectively. The type space is T = [1,∞) and the signal space is S = R+. The
best action of the receiver when the sender is of type t ∈ T is α(t) = t, and the
cost for the sender when he is of type t ∈ T and sends signal s ∈ S is c(s, t) = s
t
.
Since this example is an instance of our model in section 3.1, we can apply
our results. By Corollary 7.1, the inverse σ of the solution τ of the differential
equation
τ ′(s) =
1
τ(s)
with τ(0) = 1
is the unique SE strategy. It is straightforward to check that τ(s) =
√
2s+ 1.
Hence, σ(t) = 12 (t
2 − 1) is the unique SE strategy of this job signaling model.
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7.3 Application: the non-differentiable case
Consider the job market model where T = A = S = R+, g(t) =
1
t+1 , h(s) = s,
and
α(t) =
{
t if 0 ≤ t ≤ 3
1
3 t+ 2 if 3 ≤ t.
Note that α is continuous, but not differentiable. Nevertheless, our results apply.
We first compute H(s, a). Note that c(s, t) = s · g(t). So, cs(s, t) = g(t), and
therefore H(s, a) = cs(s, α
−1(a)) = g(α−1(a)). It is now easy to compute that
α−1(a) =
{
a if 0 ≤ a ≤ 3
3a− 6 if 3 ≤ a and H(s, a) =
{ 1
a+1 if 0 ≤ a ≤ 3
1
3a−5 if 3 ≤ a.
Thus, Theorem 6.3 states that a separating equilibrium strategy σ is determined
by σ = γ−1 ◦ α where γ solves the initial value problem that f(0) = 0 and
f ′(s) = (H(s, f(s)) =)


1
f(s)+1 if 0 ≤ f(s) ≤ 3
1
3f(s)−5 if 3 ≤ f(s).
The (unique) solution to the differential equation above is
γ(s) =
{ √
s+ 1− 1 if 0 ≤ s ≤ 15
1
3 ·
(√
6s− 74 + 5) if 15 ≤ s.
We get that
γ−1(a) =
{
(a+ 1)2 − 1 if 0 ≤ a ≤ 3
1
6 ·
(
(3a− 5)2 + 74) if 3 ≤ a.
Hence, since σ = γ−1 ◦ α, we find that
σ(t) =
{
(t+ 1)2 − 1 if 0 ≤ t ≤ 3
1
6 ·
(
(t+ 1)2 + 74
)
if 3 ≤ t.
Finally, note that the SE strategy σ is indeed continuous, and that, although γ
is differentiable, the SE strategy σ is not.
7.4 Application: incentives for truthful reporting
Our results also have implications for mechanism design. Note that T is a
subset of S. Also note in the job market signaling application that merely the
payment scheme α(t) = t does not induce the truthful report σ(t) = t, but
σ(t) = 12 (t
2 − 1) instead.
If we want σ(t) = t for all t ∈ T , then the SE condition that σ = (f∗)−1 ◦ α
yields f∗(t) = α(t) for all t ∈ T . Hence, by Theorem 6.4,
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Theorem 7.2 The model allows truthful reporting in equilibrium precisely when
α solves
α′(t) = H(t, α(t)) = cs(t, t).
If we consider the signaling cost function c(s, t) = s
t+1 , then cs(t, t) =
1
t+1 ,
so that the differential equation α′(t) = 1
t+1 yields α(t) = log(t + 1). Thus,
in order to induce truthful reporting, the planner needs to apply the specific
reward function α(t) = log(t+ 1).
8 Discussion
In the context of one-dimensional signaling games, we characterized the set of
separating equilibrium strategies using techniques known from network theory
and mechanism design with non-differentiable utility. We showed that, in case
type space is finite, the set of SE strategies forms a lattice. We constructed an
algorithm to compute SE strategies, and applied our results in the context of a
principal-agent model with production. In case type space is a closed halfline,
we identified conditions under which there exists a unique SE strategy, and
showed how to compute the SE strategy by means of a differential equation.
We applied these results in several examples, including a generalization of the
Spence job market model, and an example with non-differentiable primitives.
Finally we briefly compare our results to Mailath [15]. Consider the class of
natural variations on the model of Spence that we discussed in section 3.1,
where α is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable, and the cost of
signaling is separable and linear in s, c(s, t) = h(s) · g(t). None of these models
are covered by the analysis in Mailath [15] since they fail conditions (4) and
(5) 6 In particular, U3 = g(t) and U33 = 0, so neither strict quasiconcavity nor
boundedness holds.
Another condition that fails to hold is condition (1) when α is only strictly
increasing and continuous. Then
U(t, tˆ, s) = α(tˆ)− h(s) · g(t).
So, requirement (1) of Mailath [15] that U is C2 does not necessarily hold.
6And for the same reason the more general results in Mailath and von Thadden [16] do
not apply here, since (4) and (5) are equivalent to assumption 2 in that paper.
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A Appendix. Riemann-Stieltjes integration
We recall the concept of the Riemann-Stieltjes integral. For r, t ∈ R with r < t,
a partition from r to t is a path pi = (t0, . . . , tk) with
r = t0 < t1 < · · · < tk−1 < tk = t.
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Let P (r, t) be the collection of partitions from r to t. Given a bounded function
f : [r, t]→ R and a partition pi from r to t, we define
Mi = sup{f(t) | ti ≤ t ≤ ti+1} and mi = inf{f(t) | ti ≤ t ≤ ti+1}.
Let g be non-decreasing on [r, t]. Given a partition pi from r to t we write
∆gi = g(ti+1)− g(ti). Write
U(pi, f, g) =
k−1∑
i=0
Mi ·∆gi and L(pi, f, g) =
k−1∑
i=0
mi ·∆gi.
It is straightforward to check that inf
pi∈P (r,t)
U(pi, f, g) and sup
pi∈P (r,t)
L(pi, f, g) exist,
and that
inf
pi∈P (r,t)
U(pi, f, g) ≥ sup
pi∈P (r,t)
L(pi, f, g).
When
inf
pi∈P (r,t)
U(pi, f, g) = sup
pi∈P (r,t)
L(pi, f, g),
we denote their common value by
∫ t
r
f(x)dg(x). This value is called the Riemann-
Stieltjes integral of f with respect to g on [r, t]. It is known that
∫ t
r
f(x)dg(x)
exists whenever f is continuous 7.
For r, t ∈ T with r > t, a partition from r to t is a path pi = (t0, . . . , tk) with
r = t0 > t1 > · · · > tk−1 > tk = t.
Let P (r, t) be the collection of partitions from r to t. We define Mi, mi and
∆gi as before, but now
L(pi, f, g) =
k−1∑
i=0
Mi ·∆gi and U(pi, f, g) =
k−1∑
i=0
mi ·∆gi.
Again, it is straightforward to check that inf
pi∈P (r,t)
U(pi, f, g) and sup
pi∈P (r,t)
L(pi, f, g)
exist, and that
inf
pi∈P (r,t)
U(pi, f, g) ≥ sup
pi∈P (r,t)
L(pi, f, g).
When
inf
pi∈P (r,t)
U(pi, f, g) = sup
pi∈P (r,t)
L(pi, f, g),
7See Rudin [21], p.125.
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we denote their common value by
∫ r
t
f(x)dg(x). It is straightforward to check
that ∫ t
r
f(x)dg(x) = −
∫ r
t
f(x)dg(x).
In principle, this is equivalent to a definition of the Riemann-Stieltjes integral
when g is non-increasing.
Theorem A.1 Let φ : [A,B]→ [a, b] be strictly increasing and continuous. Let
α be an increasing function on [a, b]. Let f be Riemann-Stieltjes integrable on
a, b] w.r.t. α. For y ∈ [A,B], β(y) = α(φ(y)) and g(y) = f(φ(y)). Then g is
Riemann-Stieltjes integrable w.r.t. g, and∫ B
A
g(y)dβ(y) =
∫ b
a
f(x)dα(x).
B Appendix. Proof of Theorem 6.3
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 6.3. Let σ be a continuous
and strictly increasing strategy for the sender. Then the function h(σ) : T → R
defined by h(σ)(t) = cs(σ(t), t) is continuous in t by assumption [7]. Hence, the
Riemann-Stieltjes integral
∫ t
r
h(σ)(x)dσ(x) exists for all r, t ∈ T with r 6= t.
Lemma B.1 Suppose that σ is strictly increasing and c has decreasing differ-
ences. Then for any r, t ∈ T with r 6= t,
dist(σ)(r, t) = inf
pi∈P (r,t)
length(l(σ))(pi).
Proof. We prove the statement in case r < t. The proof for the case where
r > t runs along similar lines. Since by definition
dist(σ)(r, t) = inf
pi∈Π(r,t)
length(l(σ))(pi).
it is obvious that
dist(σ)(r, t) ≤ length(l(σ))(pi)
for any partition pi from r to t. To show the reverse inequality, by definition of
dist(σ)(r, t) there exists a path pi = (t0, . . . , tn) in H from r to t such that
length(l(σ))(pi) < dist(σ)(r, t) + ε.
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Now suppose there is a k with tk < tk+1 and tk+1 > tk+2. It follows from
monotonicity and decomposition monotonicity that length(ρ) ≤ length(pi) for
the path
ρ = (t0, . . . , tk, tk+2, . . . , tn).
Iteration of this argument yields a partition pi∗ from r to t with length(l(σ))(pi∗) ≤
length(l(σ))(pi).
Lemma B.2 Suppose that σ is continuous and strictly increasing. Then, for
any partition pi from r to t,
L(pi, h, σ) ≤ length(l(σ))(pi) ≤ U(pi, h, σ).
Proof. We construct the proof for the case where r < t. Again, the remaining
case where r > t runs along similar lines. Take a partition pi = (t0, . . . , tk) from
r to t. Take i fixed. By assumption [6], the map y 7→ cs(y, ti) is continuous on
the interval [σ(ti), σ(ti+1)]. Write mi = min{cs(y, ti) | σ(ti) ≤ y ≤ σ(ti+1)}.
Now, since σ is strictly increasing,
length(l(σ))(pi) =
k−1∑
i=0
l(σ)(ti, ti+1)
=
k−1∑
i=0
[c(σ(ti+1), ti)− c(σ(ti), ti)]
≥
k−1∑
i=0
mi · [σ(ti+1)− σ(ti)].
On the other hand,
L(pi, h, σ) =
k−1∑
i=0
ni · [σ(ti+1)− σ(ti)]
where ni = min{cs(σ(x), ti) | ti ≤ x ≤ ti+1}. Since σ is continuous and strictly
increasing, it follows that mi = ni for all i. Hence, length(l(σ))(pi) ≥ U(pi, h, σ).
Similarly, length(l(σ))(pi) ≤ U(pi, h, σ).
For two partitions pi = (t1, . . . , tk) and ρ = (r1, . . . , rm), we write pi ∨ ρ for the
(unique) partition (u1, . . . , up) with
{u1, . . . , up} = {r1, . . . , rm} ∪ {t1, . . . , tk}.
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Lemma B.3 Let σ be strictly increasing and continuous. Suppose that c has
decreasing differences. Then
sup
pi∈P (r,t)
L(pi, h, σ) ≤ dist(σ)(r, t).
Proof. By Lemma 4.3, l(σ) is decomposition monotone. So, length(l(σ))(pi ∨
ρ) ≤ length(l(σ))(pi) for any pi, ρ ∈ P (r, t). Since also L(pi, h, σ) ≤ L(pi ∨ ρ, h, σ)
for any pi, ρ ∈ P (r, t), we get the result by Lemma B.2.
Lemma B.4 Let σ be strictly increasing and continuous. Suppose that c has
decreasing differences. Then for all r, t ∈ T with r 6= t,∫ t
r
h(σ)(x)dσ(x) = dist(σ)(r, t).
Proof. By Lemmas B.1 and B.2,∫ t
r
h(σ)(x)dσ(x) = inf
pi∈P (r,t)
U(pi, h, σ) ≥ inf
pi∈P (r,t)
length(l(σ))(pi) = dist(σ)(r, t).
On the other hand, by Lemma B.3,∫ t
r
h(σ)(x)dσ(x) = sup
pi∈P (r,t)
L(pi, h, σ) ≤ dist(σ)(r, t).
This completes the proof.
Lemma B.5 Let σ be an SE strategy. Suppose that c has decreasing differences.
Then for all t ∈ T ,
α(t) =
∫ t
t
h(σ)(x)dσ(x).
Proof. Take r, t ∈ T with r 6= t. We show that
α(t)− α(r) =
∫ t
r
h(σ)(x)dσ(x).
The claim then follows by taking r = t and using the fact that α(t) = 0. Take
r, t with r 6= t. Let pi = (t0, . . . , tk) be a partition from r to t. Then
α(t)− α(r) =
k−1∑
i=0
(α(ti+1)− α(ti))
≤
k−1∑
i=0
l(σ)(ti, ti+1)
= length(l(σ))(pi).
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Hence, by Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.4
α(t)− α(r) ≤ inf
pi∈P (r,t)
length(l(σ))(pi) =
∫ t
r
h(σ)(x)dσ(x).
This also implies that
α(r)− α(t) ≤
∫ r
t
h(σ)(x)dσ(x) = −
∫ t
r
h(σ)(x)dσ(x)
so that ∫ t
r
h(σ)(x)dσ(x) ≤ α(t)− α(r).
This completes the proof.
C Appendix. Proof of Theorem 6.4
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 6.4. We prove the following
fact. The proof is loosely based on a similar proof by Peano.
Theorem C.1 Let V = R+ × R+. Suppose H : V → R is continuous and
bounded. Then there exists at least one solution of the initial value problem
f ′(s) = H(s, f(s)) with f(0) = 0.
Moreover, any solution is automatically continuously differentiable.
Proof. For n, k ∈ N define sn,k = k · 2−n. Now take n ∈ N fixed for the
moment. We set xn,0 = 0, and for k ∈ N
xn,k+1 = xn,k + 2
−n ·H(sn,k, xn,k).
Define fn : R+ → R by, for s ∈ [sn,k, sn,k+1),
fn(s) = xn,k + 2
n · (s− sk) · (xn,k+1 − xn,k) .
Let M > 0 be such that |H(s, a)| ≤ M for all (s, a) ∈ V . First we show for all
s, s′ ∈ R+ that
|fn(s′)− fn(s)| ≤M · |s′ − s|.
Take k,m such that s ∈ [sn,k, sn,k+1) and s′ ∈ [sn,m, sn,m+1). Then fn(s) is a
linear interpolation between xn,k and xn,k+1, and fn(s
′) is a linear interpolation
between xn,m and xn,m+1. Therefore it suffices to prove that
|xn,k+i − xn,k| ≤M · |sn,k+i − sn,k|.
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This however immediately follows from the observation that
|xn,k+1 − xn,k| =
∣∣2−n ·H(sn,k, xn,k)∣∣
≤ 2−n ·M
= M · |sn,k+1 − sn,k|.
Now write
D = {k · 2−n | k, n ∈ N}.
Obviously D is a countable set. Let d1, d2, . . . be an enumeration of D. Consider
d1 ∈ D. Then for all n we have |fn(d1)| ≤ M · d1. So, there is a subsequence
(f1n)
∞
n=1 of (fn)
∞
n=1 for which (f
1
n(d1))
∞
n=1 is convergent. Iteratively for k =
1, 2, . . . we can take a subsequence (fkn)
∞
n=1 of (f
k−1
n )
∞
n=1 for which (f
k
n(dl))
∞
n=1
is convergent for all l = 1, . . . k. Then for the sequence (fkk )
∞
k=1 we have that
(fkk (d))
∞
k=1 is convergent for all d ∈ D.
Write gk = f
k
k . Take any s ≥ 0. We argue that (gk(s))∞k=1 is Cauchy. Take
ε > 0. Since D is dense in R+, we can take a d ∈ D with |s−d| < ε3M . Further,
since (gk(d))
∞
k=1 is convergent, we can take K > 0 such that
|gk(d)− gm(d)| < ε
3
whenever k,m > K. Then, for k,m > K,
|gk(s)− gm(s)| = |gk(s)− gk(d) + gk(d)− gm(d) + gm(d)− gm(s)|
≤ |gk(s)− gk(d)|+ |gk(d)− gm(d)|+ |gm(d)− gm(s)|
< M · |s− d|+ ε
3
+M · |s− d|
≤ M · ε
3M
+
ε
3
+M · ε
3M
= ε.
Define f(s) = limn→∞ gn(s). We claim that f is continuous. Take any s, s
′ ≥ 0.
Since (gn)
∞
n=1 is a subsequence of (fn)
∞
n=1, we know from the argument above
that
|gn(s′)− gn(s)| ≤M · |s′ − s|
for all n. The claim now follows by taking limits for n→∞.
So, the function s 7→ H(s, f(s)) is continuous. Then it is integrable on bounded
intervals. Take any s ≥ 0. We show that
f(s) =
∫ s
0
H(u, f(u))du.
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Take n ∈ N fixed. Let p(n) be the natural number such that gn = fnn = fp(n).
Define
hn(s) = H(sp(n),k, xp(n),k) if s ∈ [sp(n),k, sp(n),k+1).
Then clearly gn(s) =
∫ s
0
hn(u)dy. We argue that hn(s)→ H(s, f(s)) as n→∞.
First note that
hn(sp(n),k) = H(sp(n),k, xp(n),k) = H(sp(n),k, fp(n)(sp(n),k)) = H(sp(n),k, gn(sp(n),k)).
Take s ≥ 0 arbitrary. Choose k(n) such that s ∈ [sp(n),k(n), sp(n),k(n)+1). Then
hn(s) = H(sp(n),k(n), xp(n),k(n)) = H(sp(n),k(n), gn(sp(n),k(n))).
Since clearly p(n) → ∞ as n → ∞, we know that sp(n),k(n) → s as n → ∞.
Therefore it suffices to show that
gn(sp(n),k(n))→ f(s).
This however follows from the observations that gn(s) → f(s) and |gn(s′) −
gn(s)| ≤M · |s′ − s|.
Hence, since |hn(s)| ≤ M for all s and n, the theorem of bounded convergence
yields
f(s) = lim
n→∞
gn(s) = lim
n→∞
∫ s
0
hn(u)du =
∫ s
0
H(u, f(u))du.
This completes the proof.
Now we are ready to show Theorem C.2. A subset I of S is called an initial
subset if for all s ∈ I and s′ ∈ S with s′ < s we have s′ ∈ I. A function g : I → R
is called a partial solution on I if g(0) = 0, g is differentiable on I, and
g′(s) = H(s, g(s))
for all s ∈ I.
Theorem C.2 Suppose that H : S × A→ R is continuous, bounded, and non-
increasing in the second coordinate. Then the initial value problem
f ′(s) = H(s, f(s)) with f(0) = 0
has a unique solution f∗. Moreover, for any partial solution g on I it holds that
f∗(s) = g(s) for all s ∈ I.
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Proof. By Theorem C.1, there exists a solution to the initial value problem.
Suppose that both f is a solution of the initial value problem, and that g is a
partial solution on I. It suffices to show that f∗(s) = g(s) for all s ∈ I.
For s ∈ I, define h(s) = f(s) − g(s). We show that h(s) = 0 for all s ∈ I.
Suppose that h(s) > 0 for some s ∈ I. Since h(0) = 0, obviously s > 0. Define
s∗ = inf{x | 0 ≤ x ≤ s and h(y) > 0 for all y ∈ (x, s)}.
Since h is continuous, h(s) > 0, and h(0) = 0, we know that s∗ < s and
h(s∗) = 0. So, since h is continuously differentiable, by the mean value theorem
there exists τ ∈ (s∗, s) with
h′(τ) =
h(s)− h(s∗)
s− s∗ =
h(s)
s− s∗ > 0.
However, τ ∈ (s∗, s) implies that h(τ) > 0 by definition of s∗. Then f(τ) > g(τ).
So, since H is non-increasing in the second argument, f ′(τ) = H(τ, f(τ)) ≤
H(τ, g(τ)) = g′(τ). Hence, h′(τ) ≤ 0. Contradiction.
